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OVER THE LAST 25 years the United States has become increasingly 
dependent on space-based systems to support its military forces, and this 
trend is likely to continue for some time. Satellite systems have become an 
integral part of nuclear deterrence by providing strategic warning of an 
attack, tactical warning of missile launches, reliable communications 
between command authorities and nuclear forces, and nuclear explosion 
detection. Satellites also aid in conventional war-fighting by providing 
accurate reconnaissance, intelligence, weather, and navigation information.  
 Current and future anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon technologies are 
capable of preventing many of our space systems from carrying out their 
missions, thereby possibly decreasing the stability of nuclear deterrence and 
weakening the effectiveness of conventional forces. This paper evaluates a 
broad range of policy options that could help to protect our space assets. It 
is found that although unilateral measures could go a long way toward 
safeguarding satellite systems, bilateral agreements are also necessary if we 
are to guard against the full range of ASAT threats without generating 
dangerous instabilities.  
WHICH SATELLITES TO PROTECT? 
 Not all satellites are equally important to our national security. The 
United States currently performs four basic types of military missions with 
satellites that are of interest here:i  
 Communications. About a dozen satellites, grouped in four satellite 
systems, are used for military and diplomatic communications. Except for 
two satellites that relay messages to the polar regions, all U.S. military 
communication satellites are in geostationary orbit (GSO) 36,000 km above 
the surface of the earth.ii In addition to the systems already in use, an 
advanced, inter-service satellite communications system called MILSTAR 
2 
(Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) is now under development, with 
deployment planned for the early 1990s. The MILSTAR system, which will 
consist of a half-dozen satellites in inclined geosynchronous orbits, is 
intended to provide command and control communications at all levels of 
conflict, including general nuclear war.  
 Navigation. The U.S. has two military navigation satellite systems: 
Transit and NAVSTAR. Transit, which travels in low earth orbit (LEO) at 
an altitude of about 1,000 km, was developed to aid in the navigation of 
Polaris submarines. The much newer NAVSTAR system, when complete, 
will consist of 18 satellites 20,000 km above the earth. Radio signals 
emitted from the navigation satellites can be used by special receivers on 
the earth to obtain very accurate position and velocity information.  
 Meteorology. Two DMSP (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program) 
satellites in LEO process visible and infrared images of the earth to provide 
information on cloud cover, temperature, and precipitation world-wide.  
 Reconnaissance and surveillance. Under this broad category are 
grouped several systems that observe electromagnetic signals reflected or 
emitted from objects on earth. These systems serve different missions: 
attack warning, nuclear burst detection, photoreconnaissance, and electronic 
surveillance. Attack warning is provided by three DSP (Defense Support 
Program) satellites in GSO that detect the infrared emissions of missiles as 
they are launched. Sensors on two dozen satellites, including those in the 
NAVSTAR system, can detect and locate nuclear explosions. 
Photoreconnaissance and electronic surveillance are highly classified 
programs, but it can be said that a small number of photoreconnaissance 
satellites travel in LEO, sometimes at altitudes less than 200 km, to obtain 
high-resolution photographs for use in treaty verification and intelligence.  
 The Soviet Union uses satellites to perform the same missions, but there 
are three important differences between U.S. and Soviet satellite systems 
that should be noted here: (a) Soviet satellites have shorter lifetimes, (b) the 
U.S.S.R. has more single-purpose satellites, and (c) the Soviets have a large 
number of satellites in Molniya (highly-elliptical) orbits instead of in GSO. 
The first two factors combine to give the U.S.S.R. a launch rate five times 
greateriii and a total constellation size nearly twice as greativ as the U.S. This 
does not mean, however, that the U.S.S.R. has an advantage over the U.S. 
in space capability. Although it may be true that the Soviets can reconstitute 
satellite systems more quickly in the event of their destruction by ASATs, it 
is not clear how valuable this would be in an actual conflict (see below). 
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The third factor may make it more difficult for the Soviets to protect their 
satellites, because satellites in Molniya orbits pass much closer to the earth 
than satellites in GSO, and therefore are much more vulnerable to ASATs 
based on earth.  
 Which satellite systems need protection most? This question is most 
easily answered when considering systems that are vital to nuclear 
deterrence, since increasing the stability of deterrence is clearly in the 
interests of both sides. To the extent that deterrence depends on both sides 
having tactical warning of an attack, it is especially important that both 
sides have confidence in the security of their attack warning satellites. 
Although attack warning is also provided by ground-based radars, satellites 
can detect missile launches 15 minutes earlier, doubling the time available 
for decisions and relaxing the need for a hair-trigger response. More 
important, without attack warning satellites we would have to rely solely 
upon radars—there would be no independent confirmation that an attack 
was underway.  
 The ability to communicate orders to surviving nuclear forces is also 
essential to deterrence. At present, the weak link in deterrence is not so 
much the likelihood that sufficient nuclear forces would survive, but rather 
the likelihood that the ability to command them would remain after a first 
strike. To the extent that the ability to maintain continuous communication 
between the National Command Authority and strategic and tactical forces 
depends on communication satellites (and the geographically dispersed 
nature of Western forces virtually requires their use), safeguarding these 
satellites is essential.  
 Turning to other military space missions, two appear important, but not 
essential to deterrence. Navigation satellites successfully targeted during a 
nuclear war would deny U.S. bombers and submarines accurate guidance 
information for the destruction of hard, or especially well-defended, targets, 
but this information would not be required in order to destroy most military, 
industrial, and population centers. Satellites capable of detecting nuclear 
bursts may also be tempting targets, since they could be used to assess the 
success of a U.S. strike or the damage from a Soviet strike. But navigation 
and nuclear burst detection are clearly less vital missions in the 
maintenance of deterrence.  
 Meteorological satellites, while very valuable in peacetime and during 
conventional wars, are less important to nuclear deterrence. 
Photoreconnaissance satellites are similarly valuable in peacetime, to 
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monitor compliance with arms control treaties, and during conventional 
wars and crises. But they may become threatening during nuclear war since 
they could locate surviving forces for retargeting. If necessary, such 
missions could be performed adequately by aircraft or fractional-orbit 
satellites in wartime.  
 Of the missions performed by satellites now in orbit, attack warning and 
communications are the most essential for maintaining confidence in 
nuclear deterrence. We should on that count endeavor to ensure their 
survival, perhaps even if, to do so, we must accept agreements that help 
ensure the survival of the same functions for the other side. Safeguarding 
these systems should be in the interests of both sides, since increasing 
confidence in their survivability increases the crisis stability of nuclear 
deterrent forces, thus making preemptive or inadvertent war less likely.  
 With respect to conventional war, it is much more difficult to determine 
which satellites should be protected. Attack warning, strategic 
communications, and nuclear burst detection are irrelevant (unless one is 
planning to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level). On the other hand, 
tactical communications, navigation, meteorological, and reconnaissance 
satellites can aid both sides substantially in targeting enemy forces. The 
latter systems are force multipliers, and each side will naturally seek to 
preserve its own capabilities while denying such capabilities to the other 
side.  
 The following discussion focuses primarily on protecting U.S. satellites 
critical to nuclear deterrence, such as attack warning and communications. 
These are the systems for which bilateral agreements are most likely to 
succeed. It should be noted, however, that technology developed to attack 
other systems could threaten these critical satellites, although the high 
orbits of attack warning and communications satellites serve to make attack 
on them much more difficult, time consuming, and costly.  
THE ASAT THREAT 
 In the broadest sense, an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system is any 
type of weapon system that can be used to interfere with the mission of a 
satellite. This includes not only damaging or destroying satellites, but also 
jamming communications and destroying ground facilities. This paper 
considers only satellite destruction, however, because the latest 
communication satellites (e.g., MILSTAR) are virtually jam-proof,v and 
because ground stations can be made much less vulnerable than satellites 
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through proliferation and mobility. This section examines the capabilities of 
current anti-satellite weapon systems and some others that may be possible 
in the future.  
 Earth-based ASATs  
 All of the current weapon systems that have potential or inherent ASAT 
capability are based on earth. Earth-based ASATs have the primary 
advantages of being larger, less vulnerable, and much cheaper to construct 
and maintain than ASATs based in space. They have the disadvantages of 
being far from targets in GSO, and of having to cope with the limitations 
imposed by the earth’s atmosphere. The two primary types of ASATs are 
missiles and directed-energy weapons.  
 Missiles 
 Ground, sea, or air-launched missiles can be used to attack satellites 
provided that their range is sufficient to reach the satellite orbit in question. 
This includes not only missiles intended for ASAT use, such as the U.S. air-
launched ASAT now in development or the Soviet ground-launched ASAT 
(both of which are only capable of attacking satellites in LEO), but also 
nuclear-armed intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs and SLBMs) and the Sprint and Galosh anti-ballistic missiles 
(ABMs).  
 With modifications that could be developed and tested in a few years, 
such as a lighter payload, proper fusing, or an additional rocket stage, 
ICBMs, SLBMs, ABMs, and current ASATs could destroy satellites in 
GSO. These weapons could use nuclear warheads of various yields or 
conventional homing warheads. ASATs using nuclear warheads have a 
damage radius ranging from tens to thousands of kilometers, depending on 
the yield of the weapon and the hardness of the target satellite, but they 
could also damage unhardened friendly satellites. Conventional warheads 
would have to come much closer to the target—within at least one 
kilometer—in order to be effective.  
 The speed of such missiles is on the order of ten kilometers per second, 
so it would take at least an hour to reach attack warning and communication 
in GSO. In the case of conventional warheads, mid-course update and 
terminal homing guidance would be required for adequate accuracy. More 
sophisticated space tracking systems than those currently in use would 
probably also be required. Any attack on satellites in GSO with earth-based 
missiles would be detectable by attack warning satellites, since the rocket 
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boosters required to reach high altitudes are very large. There would be 
sufficient time to discover the purpose of the missile and alert the nuclear 
forces, hence fulfilling at least some of the attack warning and 
communications missions of the satellites. Because they are slow and 
detectable, earth-based missiles probably do not represent the most 
dangerous threat to satellites in GSO.  
 The situation for satellites in LEO is quite different. Earth-based 
missiles can reach satellites orbiting 200 to 1000 km above the earth in a 
few minutes, and guidance technologies have already been proven effective 
enough to use conventional warheads (or no warhead at all, by striking the 
satellite directly) at these distances.  
 Directed-energy weapons 
 Ground-based high-energy lasers (HELs) of certain wavelengths could 
destroy satellites through heating or shock. HELs have the advantage of 
delivering energy fast—only a tenth of a second is needed to reach GSO 
from the ground—and the disadvantages of being large and inefficient in 
terms of the amount of energy required to destroy a target. Several types of 
HELs (chemical, free-electron, and excimer lasers) under development are 
potential earth-based ASAT weapons.  
 Much has been said about the destructive potential of HELs against 
space objects, but it is important to note the differing requirements for 
damaging one unhardened satellite under test conditions, and attacking 
hardened satellite systems during war. Although a high-quality one 
megawatt ground-based laser, which may feasible in the next few years, 
could damage or destroy unhardened satellites in GSO by irradiating them 
for tens of minutes, this does not mean that effective ASATs could be based 
on such lasers. An actual attack against a hardened communications satellite 
system, for example, would require the certain destruction of several 
satellites in less than a minute. A laser weapon capable of this task would 
emit at least a hundred megawatts of power. It is likely to take some time to 
develop such large lasers, and even then it may prove impossible to transmit 
such large amounts of power through the atmosphere. At least five such 
lasers located around the world would be needed to provide continuous 
coverage of all GSO satellite targets.  
 As noted above, however, satellites in LEO are much less demanding 
targets.  Most could be destroyed by an ASAT system based on the current 
state-of-the-art chemical laser, although at large cost. Even very hard 
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satellites could be destroyed with lasers that will probably become available 
in the 1990s.  
 Space-Based ASATs 
 Weapons based in space can be much closer to and have a clearer view 
of their targets than earth-based ASATs; hence, for a given level of 
technology, they can be more effective against satellites in any orbit. Space-
based ASATs are more vulnerable, however, and the costs associated with 
deploying and maintaining ASATs in space are much greater than the costs 
of earth-based ASATs. Three types of potential space-based ASAT 
weapons are explored here: space mines, kinetic-energy weapons, and 
directed-energy weapons.  
 Space mines 
 A space mine would be a satellite that is placed in the same orbit as a 
target satellite (usually well in advance of an attack), and which attempts to 
remain within lethal range at all times. Space mines could be salvage-fused, 
meaning that any attempt to interfere with them would cause them to 
explode, destroying the target satellite in the process. Although no space 
mines are known to exist, they could probably be developed in a few years.  
 If armed with conventional warheads, the space mine would have to stay 
within a kilometer of the target at all times, a requirement that may be 
difficult to meet. Nuclear space mines would be destructive at much larger 
distances (tens or hundreds of kilometers), but they could also destroy or 
interfere with friendly satellites nearby. The deployment of nuclear 
weapons in space is banned by the Outer Space Treaty. The deployment of 
space mines during peacetime could pose the danger of inadvertent war 
through accidental detonation, and their use during a conventional war to 
destroy reconnaissance satellites could contribute to the likelihood of 
escalation.  
 Kinetic-energy weapons 
 Kinetic-energy weapons, either homing missiles or projectiles fired from 
guns, could be used to destroy satellites by direct impact. Rail guns, which 
use powerful magnetic fields to accelerate projectiles, are theoretically 
capable of much higher velocities than are achievable with rockets, 
although current devices are far less capable than rockets. A rail gun would 
weigh hundreds of tons and would not be cost effective unless it could 
destroy many satellites.vi  
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 Homing missiles could attack satellites in GSO in several minutes if 
they were “parked” in orbits a few hundred kilometers from the target 
satellite. (This concept differs from a space mine in that the target normally 
remains outside lethal range.) The size and technological requirements of 
such a missile would be comparable to those of the current U.S. air-
launched ASAT homing missile, and therefore are feasible in the near-term. 
Such missiles could carry low-yield nuclear weapons, which would 
considerably reduce the tracking requirements and be more robust to 
defensive countermeasures, but would have the liabilities of nuclear use 
noted above.  
 Space-based directed-energy weapons 
 Directed-energy weapons based in space can use uncharged particles 
(photons or neutral atoms) of any energy. (Charged particle beams cannot 
be used as ASAT weapons because the earth’s magnetic field deflects 
them.) Candidate technologies, none of which are currently judged feasible 
in the short-term, are neutral particle beams, the high-energy lasers 
discussed above, x-ray lasers, and microwave weapons.  
 Neutral particle beams. Neutral particle beam (NPB) weapons, which 
are the best-developed directed-energy weapons suitable for space 
deployment, are similar to the accelerators used by particle physicists. The 
particle energy is limited by the size of the accelerator; current design 
concepts generate particles with energies of a few hundred million electron 
volts (MeV). Protons of this energy have the capacity to penetrate to the 
center of a target satellite and destroy or damage its electronics. It may be 
possible to harden electronics, which would lead to a corresponding 
increase in the amount of time the NPB would have to irradiate the target. 
Even so, NPBs, if they can be constructed in space, might be very effective 
against satellites in GSO. Since a space-based NPB weapon is unlikely to 
cost less than a target satellite, its range would have to be large enough to 
engage several targets at once. An alternate approach would be to put an 
NPB in a highly-elliptical orbit that intersects GSO or into counter-rotating 
GSO, allowing a single low-power weapon to attack all satellites in GSO, 
though over an extended period of time (at least 12 hours). The power 
requirements for a NPB could be quite large. Depending on the 
circumstances, over l0 tons of fuel might be required to destroy a 1-ton 
satellite. An NPB would have a linear dimension of perhaps 50 meters, 
making it a very noticeable object.vii  
  Space-based HELs. HELs based in space could be much smaller than 
earth-based HELs because they could be placed close to target satellites, 
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but as range of the laser decreases so does the number of targets that can be 
attacked in a given amount of time. For example, less than one-thousandth 
the power of an earth-based laser would be required to destroy a target in 
GSO from a distance of 1,000 km, but then the laser could only attack a 
single satellite at a time. It is very difficult to hide a space-based HEL, 
because reducing the size of the mirror (which might be several meters in 
diameter) increases the power requirements. Even a low-power space-based 
laser would be quite noticeable and identifiable.  
  X-ray lasers. X-ray lasers have the primary advantage of a very 
compact and extremely high-power energy source: a nuclear explosion. 
This allows the possibility that x-ray lasers based in space might not be 
identifiable, or that they could be put on earth-based missiles and fired as 
soon as they are above the atmosphere (within a few minutes). They would 
require the launching and exploding of nuclear weapons in space. In theory, 
they could be very effective ASATs, capable of destroying instantaneously 
a number of satellites at very long ranges. They are in the research stage 
and presently it is not possible to say what can be attained, however.  
  Microwave weapons. It may be possible to build a device that uses a 
nuclear explosion to generate a narrow beam of microwaves. Electronic 
circuits are probably at least three orders of magnitude more vulnerable to 
microwave energy than to x-ray or particle-beam energy. On the other hand, 
the destruction of electronics would not usually be noticeable from the 
outside of a satellite, leading to uncertainty about disablement of the target. 
Much more work needs to be done on this concept before further judgments 
can be made about its ultimate usefulness as a weapon.  
 In the preceding discussion, weapon system size requirements have been 
posited in terms of their effectiveness relative to U.S. estimates of U.S. 
satellite vulnerability. Actual ASAT weapons would likely be much more 
powerful (by perhaps an order of magnitude) for the following reason: for 
any given destructive mechanism (x-rays, laser irradiation, bullets, etc.), 
there is a fairly well-defined threshold beyond which a given satellite will 
fail. The defender, who knows the details of the satellite design, can 
estimate this threshold with some confidence, although there will always be 
some uncertainty in the estimate of the system’s vulnerability. Prudence 
requires that the estimate be lowered, so that one can be confident that the 
system could survive an attack of that magnitude. The attacker, on the other 
hand, does not know the details of the design, and will be inclined to 
substantially overestimate the lethal level required to be confident that the 
target system will be destroyed. In most cases an attacker will want a “hard 
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kill” of the system (i.e., the damage to target must be easily visible), which 
also increases the size of the weapon.  
POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ASATs 
 Unilateral countermeasures 
 Unilateral countermeasures are actions that the United States or the 
Soviet Union could take to safeguard satellites without the cooperation of 
other countries. Since the ASAT threat to high-altitude satellite systems is 
as yet undefined, actions taken should be those effective against a wide 
range of technologies.  
 Passive countermeasures 
 Passive unilateral countermeasures are those that enable the satellite to 
withstand or avoid the attack by ASATs. These may include (a) hardening 
the satellite against attack mechanisms (heating, shock, irradiation, and 
jamming), (b) evasion (maneuvering, hiding, and use of decoys), (c) 
redundancy (spares in orbit or ready to launch, and land-based back-ups to 
space-based systems), and (d) placing satellites in less vulnerable orbits.  
 Hardening can be achieved by making the working components of the 
satellite (e.g., solar cells or microprocessors) less vulnerable to the ASAT 
threat and/or by surrounding the satellite or vulnerable components with an 
appropriate shield. Examples of internal hardening are radiation-resistant 
electronics to protect against the effects of nuclear weapons or NPBs, or 
heat-resistant components to withstand laser heating. Examples of shields 
are multi-component x-ray shields against nuclear weapons and reflective 
or ablative shields and sensor shutters against lasers. The measures taken to 
address one class of threat must be consistent with and complementary to 
those taken to guard against other threats.  
 These hardening measures can go a long way toward reducing satellite 
vulnerability, and can also have a favorable cost-exchange ratio against the 
offense. For example, hardening electronics to levels feasible in the near 
term would force long-range NPB weapons to consume an amount of fuel 
much more massive than the satellite it is attacking. The attacker might 
compensate by bringing the NPB closer to its targets, but this would require 
the construction of additional (expensive) NPB weapons. Another example 
is hardening against continuous wave (CW) lasers; measures that increase 
the hardening of satellites by a factor of 10 might cost about 10% of total 
satellite costs,viii but would require a laser 10 times more powerful—and 
much more costly—to destroy those satellites.  
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 Cost-effectiveness trade-offs are different with regard to hardening 
against nuclear weapons or kinetic-energy weapons. The cost of a nuclear 
weapon is not proportional to its yield: for example, a 100 kiloton (kt) 
weapon may not cost much more than a 10 kt weapon.ix Hardening against 
nuclear weapons can prevent the destruction of more than one satellite by a 
single weapon, or, in the case of an x-ray laser, decrease the number of 
satellites a single x-ray laser can destroy. For a given yield, hardening can 
also force the attacker to come closer to the satellite, thereby increasing 
warning time and the opportunity for maneuvering.  
 However, neither a nuclear explosion dedicated to the destruction of a 
single satellite nor, in the case of kinetic-energy weapons, a direct hit by a 
projectile, can be countered by any reasonable level of hardening. It is also 
very difficult to harden against the shock effects caused by very short-
duration (“pulsed”) chemical or x-ray lasers. For cost-effective unilateral 
countermeasures against nuclear, kinetic-energy, or pulsed-laser weapons, 
one must turn to the tactics of evasion and proliferation.  
 Maneuvering is effective against some threats. High-orbit satellites, for 
example, need only modest maneuvering capability to evade nuclear-armed 
earth-based missiles. This is true even if the missiles have terminal homing 
guidance, because the homing system is not effective until the missile is 
within a few dozen kilometers from the target, and the satellite can escape 
from this small volume of space in which the missile expects to find its 
target before the homing system is turned on. If the ASAT missile is space-
based less than a thousand kilometers from the satellite, however, the fuel 
requirements for effective maneuvering would be excessive, because the 
satellite would have to accelerate very quickly to escape the homing system. 
Maneuvering can be defeated by giving missiles mid-course update 
capability, so they can track the maneuvers of target satellites during the 
entire missile flight. Maneuvering doesn’t help at all if there is no warning, 
as would be the case with directed-energy weapons or close-by space 
mines.  
 Decoys may be deployed before or after attack. If decoys are deployed 
before an attack, the attacker can examine them. The decoys therefore must 
be realistic, and therefore expensive. This cost could be reduced by keeping 
a number of inactive satellites in orbit, and having the decoys mimic these. 
This is sometimes called “anti-simulation,” because one is trying to make 
the real thing (the inactive satellites) look like the cheap decoys, rather than 
trying to make expensive decoys that mimic the functions of active 
satellites. But even inactive satellites must perform a number of 
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sophisticated functions, especially if the military is to trust that these 
systems would perform properly when called upon. Testing the inactive 
satellites would, however, let the other side know that they were real and 
not decoys. If warning of an ASAT attack is available, cheap decoys could 
be deployed at the moment of attack, but this strategy will only work 
against non-nuclear homing missiles—ballistic missiles are not smart 
enough to be fooled by decoys (they have to be targeted on something that 
is already there), and directed-energy weapons give no warning.  
 Another form of evasion is hiding, which might be effective against 
current ground-based radar and optical satellite space tracking systems. But, 
even though the current optical tracking system can detect nothing smaller 
than a one meter-sized object at geosynchronous distances,x nearly all 
satellites require exposed components (antennae, solar cells, etc.) that are 
difficult to conceal. Space-based satellite surveillance systems that use a 
larger part of the electromagnetic spectrum could make hiding near the 
earth all but impossible (e.g., reducing the optical signal of a satellite by 
painting it black inevitably increases its infrared signal by making it hotter).  
 Redundancy is another possibility. If one could increase the number of 
hardened satellites by a substantial factor, one would, at the very least, 
force the ASAT system to become large and obvious. But redundancy alone 
tends not to be not cost-effective, because if an ASAT system is cost-
effective against some number of satellites, it is likely to be cost-effective 
against twice that number. The advantage might go to the defense, however, 
if it were possible to replace a few complex, expensive, multi-purpose 
satellites with many simpler, cheaper, single-purpose satellites, but this is 
certainly not the current trend in U.S. satellite design. Soviet satellite 
systems tend to be more redundant than their U.S. counterparts.  
 A related countermeasure is reconstitution, which is the ability to 
quickly replace satellites that have been destroyed. This is not a practical 
option for the satellites and time scales that we are most concerned about. 
Even if replacement satellites were stockpiled (at a cost of several hundred 
million dollars each), they would take many hours to launch, and many 
more hours to maneuver into orbit.  
 Another potentially effective passive countermeasure would be to move 
critical satellites into higher, less-crowded orbits. These non-GSO orbits 
offer several advantages: (a) ground-based ASATs missiles would take 
longer to reach higher altitudes, increasing the time available for warning, 
maneuvering, and decoy deployment; (b) the power requirement for a 
13 
ground-based laser ASAT is proportional to the square of the satellite 
altitude, so that a target at 10 times GSO would require a laser power 100 
times greater to destroy than the same target in GSO; (c) there are many 
non-synchronous orbits, unlike the single GSO, so such orbits would be less 
crowded and the identification of potentially hostile satellites or space 
mines much easier; and (d) satellites in higher orbits are more difficult to 
track from the ground, which could frustrate ASAT attacks.  
 There are, however, several disadvantages of basing satellites in high 
orbits. First, the cost and complexity of satellites and ground stations would 
increase somewhat, due to tracking requirements (satellites outside GSO 
orbit more slowly than the earth revolves), and due to the fact that 
transmitting power and/or receiver sensitivity would have to compensate for 
the increased distance from the earth. Second, the ability of reconnaissance 
and surveillance satellites, such as attack warning satellites, to see details 
on the earth’s surface decreases with distance. Third, the cost of launching 
satellites into orbits above GSO would be somewhat greater, since more 
energy is required for a given payload mass. Note that the number of 
satellites necessary to perform a mission need not increase, but that the size, 
power requirements, and cost of each satellite would be greater.  
 Passive countermeasures, especially hardening, can go a long way 
toward decreasing the vulnerability of satellites. They also cause effective 
ASAT systems to become large, expensive, and detectable. A program of 
passive countermeasures undertaken now could greatly increase the 
survivability of future systems, since it would take the Soviet Union at least 
a decade (and probably much longer) to design, test, and deploy an 
advanced ASAT capable of threatening critical satellites in GSO. But 
passive countermeasures are not sufficient by themselves to ensure 
survivability. There is no known perfect passive countermeasure, nor are 
there perfect substitutes for space assets. Secure, redundant land systems 
would not satisfy all strategic requirements and would be very expensive 
for the U.S. (although less so for the U.S.S.R.). In the case of attack 
warning, for example, reliance on land-based systems would mean giving 
up independent confirmation that an attack was on the way, relying on half 
the current warning time, or giving up reliance on tactical warning 
altogether, none of which are acceptable.  
 Active countermeasures 
 Active unilateral countermeasures are those that threaten an attacking 
ASAT system. This means deploying one’s own ASAT either to deter 
attack or to destroy the opposing ASAT. Systems with the latter mission are 
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sometimes called DSATs (defensive satellites), but it is not clear what the 
technical difference might be between systems that are designed to kill 
satellites generally and those intended to kill ASAT satellites. A basis for a 
valid distinction might be DSAT systems that are only effective over a very 
limited range and that are associated with a specific satellite system. In this 
case, DSATs could legitimately be seen as strictly defensive, since they 
could not attack an opposing ASAT system unless it advanced within range. 
Although this might be a reasonable limitation if imposed in relation to 
ASAT space mines or missiles, such defenses would be worthless against 
directed-energy weapons unless the range of the DSAT was at least as great 
as that of the opposing ASAT, which would make it an ASAT in its own 
right.  
 Self-defense systems could not be added to current satellites, since the 
weight and power requirements of such add-on systems would be far 
greater than those of the satellite they would be protecting. In addition, the 
operation of some DSAT weapons could destroy any nearby satellite. A 
separate DSAT satellite, very much resembling the ASAT systems 
described above, would be needed. Active defense against a nuclear 
warhead at a range of 1,000 km, for example, would require a very large 
NPB or laser. DSAT weapons may not be able to defend the satellite at all 
against nuclear weapons if they were salvage-fused.  
 The use of space-based DSATs could create an advantage for 
preemption and therefore could be crisis unstable. If both sides depend on 
satellites to perform crucial deterrence functions, and both sides also deploy 
ASATs to threaten the other’s satellites (as well as their ASATs), then 
substantial benefits could accrue to the side going first. This is essentially 
the same argument that is used when evaluating vulnerable land-based 
ICBMs: if both sides have valuable but vulnerable weapons, each will fear 
preemption by the other, and will therefore be tempted to preempt. A crisis 
or accident (e.g., collision with space debris) could trigger a satellite war 
and measurably raise the probability of terrestrial war. Active ASAT 
defense itself is also likely to be arms-race unstable for similar reasons. If 
ASATs are practical, then so are DSATs, which could also function as 
ASATs, leading to an almost inevitable measure/countermeasure arms race 
in space.  
 These arguments apply especially to space-based systems; if ASATs are 
earth-based and do not rely on space-based components, then ASATs could 
not attack other ASATs, and ASAT deterrence may be crisis stable, though 
it will still add a component to the arms race. An example is the U.S. ASAT 
15 
under development, which can reach targets anywhere in LEO but cannot 
easily be preemptively destroyed.  
 But if ASATs can be made invulnerable to preemption, then DSATs 
cannot prevent satellite destruction, they can only threaten retaliation in 
kind.  ASAT deterrence may not work, however, if one side valued the 
destruction of the other side’s satellites more than the survival of its own. 
This appears to be the case with preemptive strategic attack, where attack 
warning, communications, and navigation satellites would be much less 
valuable to the attacker after his missiles were launched, or in the case of a 
conventional war, in which the U.S. would be more dependent on satellites 
than the U.S.S.R. Thus, even if ASATs can’t threaten other ASATs, the 
situation could still be unstable.  
 Bilateral agreements 
 If both sides have a stronger interest—at least with respect to war 
prevention—in safeguarding their own space assets (or some part of them) 
than in maintaining a capacity to destroy the other side’s, and if unilateral 
measures taken to safeguard these assets force ASAT systems to be 
expensive and detectable, then verifiable bilateral or multilateral 
agreements to limit ASAT technologies or deployments may be possible 
and may be perceived by both sides to improve the security of both. For this 
to occur, policy decisions must be reached on both sides to the effect that 
such factors as enhanced crisis stability and decreased arms expenditures 
outweigh the potential wartime advantages to be gained by holding satellite 
systems at risk. On this reasoning, the Scowcroft Commission—formed by 
President Reagan to evaluate basing schemes for the MX missile—
recommended that the U.S. attempt to negotiate agreements to make critical 
satellites more survivable.xi  
 Measures taken unilaterally to make satellite systems survivable will 
make bilateral ASAT controls more attractive, because they serve to 
increase the cost and decrease the effectiveness of ASAT systems, and 
because they drive ASAT systems to larger dimensions and power 
requirements so that bans and restrictions are more likely to be verifiable. A 
variety of restrictions on ASAT development, testing, and deployment 
might be considered.  
 Testing and deployment of the current U.S. and Soviet ASAT weapons, 
as well as the testing of other earth-based missiles in an ASAT mode, might 
be mutually restricted or banned. If the perceived military utility of being 
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able to destroy low-orbit surveillance and reconnaissance satellites is great, 
both sides may want to keep this ability while banning tests at higher 
altitudes. One might also choose to “grandfather” existing ASATs because 
of the difficulty of verifying a ban on their deployment (the weapons are 
small and easily concealable), given that they have already been developed 
and tested (although the U.S. ASAT is not fully tested).  
 Verifying restrictions on ASAT testing may be problematic, however. If 
earth-based ASATs can be tested successfully against a point in space, no 
one might know that a test had occurred, or that the test involved an ASAT 
weapon. If current low-altitude ASAT weapons are permitted, would low-
altitude tests be sufficient to permit development of a high-altitude ASAT? 
As an example in which this would be the case, adding a third stage to the 
current U.S. air-launched ASAT might allow it to reach satellites in GSO; 
one may want to ban the testing of modifications of current ASATs to 
prevent this from happening. The importance of these issues should be 
resolved before designing a specific agreement.  
 Negotiated “keep-out” zones represent a way to increase the separation 
between satellites of different nations through formal agreements. An 
important argument for keep-out zones is they are one of what appears to be 
only two effective defenses against space mines, whether nuclear or 
conventional, because of the short range and rapid engagement they imply. 
Any object that could be a space mine could be attacked before it could 
come within lethal range, an arrangement that is fraught with instabilities. 
Alternatively, we can try to deal with the problem through the type of 
agreement proposed here.  
 As an example of a structured agreement, the United Nations could 
partition certain zones of space. The most crowded and vital orbit, GSO, is 
already organized to prevent radio interference. GSO might be divided into 
36 zones, each 10° wide, 12 of which would be assigned to NATO and 
other U.S. allies, 12 to the Warsaw pact and other S.U. allies, and 12 to 
neutral or non-aligned countries.xii This type of agreement would have the 
advantage that only six existing satellites would need to be moved. 
Satellites stationed in the middle of a zone would be at least 3,700 km from 
possible ASATs in an adjacent zone. Even a very large nuclear explosion 
could not destroy minimally hardened satellites at this distance. Homing 
missile ASATs parked at this distance would require several minutes for an 
attack, allowing sufficient time for the threat to be assessed and for a 
warning message to be relayed to earth.  
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 Other orbits might be organized into, say, 72 spherical shells 5,000 km 
“thick,” starting 10,000 km above the earth and going out to the moon’s 
orbit of 380,000 km, allocated in a manner similar to the 36 zones of GSO. 
This would include the orbits of NAVSTAR and the Soviet’s NAVSTAR-
like navigation systems. Space inside 10,000 km and outside the moon’s 
orbit would be unregulated.  
 Structured keep-out zones may not be acceptable to the world 
community, however. First, equatorial nations will oppose any measure 
which deeds the use of the space above their nation to some other country 
or collection of countries. Second, the United Nations current position is 
that no state can claim a part of space for its own. Keep-out zones may also 
impose restrictions on satellite missions. It is current practice for satellites 
to drift several degrees about their mean positions, which would be 
impermissible at the edges of keep-out zones. Satellites could be kept on 
tighter orbits, though this would require more fuel.  
 There are alternative, less rigidly structured possibilities. Spheres of, for 
example, 1,000 km radius centered on certain satellites could be agreed to 
be keep-out zones. Foreign satellites would be prohibited from entering 
these spheres without permission. This would appear to allow only 130 or 
so protected satellites in GSO, but the actual upper limit would be several 
times larger, since satellites of allied nations could be stationed within each 
other’s zones by permission, and since slightly tilted orbits could be used. 
Such agreements would work better in non-synchronous orbits where 
crowding is less of a problem.  
 Foreign satellites would have to be allowed the right of friendly passage, 
subject to certain restrictions, such as a maximum number of transits per 
day. Satellites from other nations wishing for some reason to share a keep-
out zone could be subject to inspection before launch. Counter-rotating 
GSO satellites and intersecting elliptical orbits pose a problem and might 
have to be limited or banned.  
 The fact that many Soviet attack warning and communications satellites 
are in Molniya orbits rather than GSO may be very important when 
designing a keep-out zone agreement. These orbits are inclined and highly 
elliptical, with an apogee (highest altitude) of approximately 40,000 km and 
a perigee (closest approach) of 500 km. Satellites in this orbit spend over 
90% of their time on one side of the earth, where they function like 
satellites in high circular orbits. But the fact that they come so close to the 
earth presents a special problem for keep-out zone agreements of all kinds, 
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especially because of the asymmetry between the U.S. and the S.U. in the 
number of satellites in this orbit. The value of keep-out zones is greatly 
diminished for satellites in Molniya orbits, because earth-based ASATs 
would be much more effective against them. Air-launched ASATs, such as 
the current U.S. ASAT, can be launched from the Southern hemisphere and 
therefore can attack these satellites at perigee, though to destroy an entire 
satellite system one would have to wait for all satellites to pass through 
perigee, which would take up to 12 hours.  
 Bans on testing large (e.g., greater than 1 MW) ground-based lasers in 
an ASAT mode and on the testing and deployment of large mirrors in space 
can mitigate the prompt threat from earth-based systems. Many of the 
remaining ASAT threats, space-based kinetic-energy and directed-energy 
weapons, could be ameliorated by a ban on their development, testing, and 
deployment in space. The testing and deployment of nuclear weapons (and 
x-ray lasers) in space is already banned. With the exception of nuclear-
weapon-driven devices, such a ban should be verifiable since the weapons 
in question would be large and identifiable, and since they would require 
testing in space to be reliable, which could be detected.  
 Finally, if nuclear directed-energy weapons, such as the x-ray laser, are 
particularly worrisome, a comprehensive test ban treaty or a low-yield 
threshold test ban treaty could be negotiated to inhibit their development 
and testing.  
 Verification 
 A variety of technologies can be used to aid in verifying the types of 
agreements proposed here. Improved space tracking and surveillance 
systems are usually proposed in connection with ASAT arms control, since 
they would aid greatly in verifying compliance with keep-out zones, 
restrictions or bans on ASAT testing, and bans on ASAT deployment in 
space. These systems can cut both ways, however, in the sense that a 
sophisticated space surveillance system can form the basis for an ASAT 
system as well as safeguard existing satellites, much as large terrestrial 
radars can form the basis for an antiballistic missile (ABM) system as well 
as an early-warning system. The current U.S.-U.S.S.R. ABM treaty 
prohibits large radars that are not on the perimeter of the nation and looking 
outward to prevent quick treaty break-out. Just as in the ABM case, the 
construction of large space surveillance systems may cause concern about 
compliance with an ASAT treaty.  
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 It may be possible to limit space tracking systems to the mission of 
verifying compliance with agreements, so that such systems would not be 
capable of missions that threaten these agreements. For instance, keep-out 
zones could be monitored by infrared sensors on board the protected 
satellite, rather than by extensive networks of dedicated satellites which 
could easily form the basis for an ASAT weapon system. This is a area that 
should receive more thought.  
 Space tracking systems can be supplemented by heat, x-ray, and 
acceleration sensors on board U.S. satellites that verify that the satellite is 
not being attacked by lasers, NPBs, nuclear weapons, or missiles. Such 
sensors are a valuable countermeasure to ASAT warfare with or without 
arms control.  
 The deployment of nuclear weapons in space (including nuclear space 
mines, nuclear homing missiles, and x-ray lasers) is banned by the Outer 
Space Treaty. At present, it is not possible to verify compliance with such a 
ban. In theory, one could inspect satellites before launch or while in space 
to detect gamma radiation from the fissile materials, but relations between 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have not been conducive to such arrangements in 
the past (although there recently have been hints that the U.S.S.R. may be 
willing to change its position). The threat from nuclear space mines might 
be sufficiently defused by keep-out zones, provided that the space 
surveillance system used for verification can determine if keep-out zones 
have been violated.  
 Nuclear explosions in space are banned by the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 
This ban is verified by nuclear-burst detection systems on board current 
U.S. satellites, for distances at least out to the moon’s orbit. This 
verification capability could be extended to much deeper orbits by 
deploying satellites dedicated to this function.  
 Verifying a ban on the testing of ground-based lasers in an ASAT mode 
is, in principle, fairly straightforward. As noted above, lasers powerful 
enough to pose a threat to high-altitude satellites will be very large. The 
U.S. has shown the ability to find much smaller lasers. Ground-based lasers 
are at fixed locations, and can only be tested during cloudless periods, when 
space surveillance of the lasers is also possible. By posting surveillance 
satellites over the laser sites, one should be able to detect, by the scattering 
of light as the beam passes through the atmosphere, whether the laser is 
being tested in an ASAT mode. In addition, if a comprehensive space 
surveillance system is available, the optical signals of all large space objects 
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could be monitored, which would make it possible to determine if they 
were being illuminated by a laser. If necessary, on-site sensors could be 
placed at large laser installations to ensure treaty compliance.  
 It is possible to verify a ban on space-based lasers and particle beam 
weapons, since such weapons would have to be large and distinctive if 
sized to attack satellites several thousand kilometers away. Testing of such 
weapons would be easy to detect by observing their thermal signature, or by 
detecting effluents given off during their operation. The destruction of 
target satellites by kinetic-energy weapons can also be verified by space 
tracking and surveillance systems.  
 Finally, it should be noted that the U.S. must maintain an excellent 
space intelligence system with or without arms control. In general, it is 
much easier to detect and monitor certain activities when they are 
constrained rather than widespread. The surveillance technologies 
necessary to verify the sorts of agreements outlined here are much less 
ambitious than those envisioned for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
for example.  
IMPACT OF ASAT LIMITATIONS 
  What impact would bilateral agreements such as those described here 
(coupled with unilateral actions to make the satellites as survivable as 
economically practical) have on the military policies of the United States 
and the Soviet Union? The most obvious effect would be to deny to both 
countries the ability to destroy high-altitude satellites, both those that are 
essential for deterrence (attack warning and communications), and those 
that may not be (navigation and nuclear burst detection). The development 
of new technologies, such as earth-based HELs, would be allowed, but they 
could not be tested in an ASAT mode. Space-basing of such technologies 
would be banned altogether.  
 SDI 
 The agreements considered in the previous section would impose 
restrictions of relevance to many military missions that are not now 
performed in space, but could be, such as ballistic missile defense. Any 
ABM system comprised of directed-energy weapons that are powerful 
enough to destroy thousands of missiles during a few minutes (boost phase) 
or tens of thousands of reentry vehicles (RVs) over tens of minutes (mid-
course phase) would almost certainly be a threat to satellites in GSO. Such 
systems could be more effective ASATs than ABM weapons, since the 
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ASAT mission can be performed at the moment of one’s choosing, and 
satellites are in general softer targets which travel on predictable paths.  
 Critics of this view point out that the distances involved in attacking a 
satellite in GSO are much greater than in attacking a missile: roughly 
36,000 km versus 1,000 km, the commonly-assumed orbit for the space-
based laser battle stations that might form the core of an ABM system in 
space. Since the intensity of a laser decreases as the square of the distance, 
the intensity at GSO will be over 1,000 times less than that on a booster; 
since satellites can be made almost as hard as boosters, satellites in GSO 
should be safe even though the system is potent against missiles. The SDI 
Organization supports high-orbit ASAT arms control measures, the 
motivation being that many of the sensors necessary for strategic defense 
would be placed in high orbits.xiii  
 This analysis is flawed in several ways, however. First, lasers could 
irradiate satellites for a much longer amount of time than they could 
irradiate boosters because there are many fewer satellites than boosters. 
ABM systems will have to successfully shoot at 1,000 (boost-phase) to 
10,000 (mid-course) objects per minute, while ASAT systems would only 
need to attack at most 100 satellites in a few minutes. In addition, many 
more laser battle stations could participate in an ASAT attack than in an 
ABM defense, because each laser satellite could target at least half of all 
high-orbit satellites, while in the ABM case, less than 1/10th of the laser 
satellites can target missiles launched from a point on the earth. These two 
considerations nullify the effect of the added distance, and make a space-
based laser system at least as effective a high-altitude ASAT as an ABM 
system. In fact, an ABM system would probably be more potent as an 
ASAT since satellites are more difficult to harden than boosters or RVs, 
and since an attack can usually be coordinated better than a defense and can 
occur at a time of the attacker’s choosing. Earth-based laser ABM weapons 
should be particularly effective against satellites, since in most such 
schemes the laser energy is reflected from mirrors in GSO to boosters at 
low altitudes. If the laser beam could destroy boosters after going up to 
GSO and back again, then it could obviously be even more effective against 
objects in GSO.  
 Directed-energy systems capable of boost-phase or mid-course ballistic-
missile defense would threaten the high-altitude space assets that the 
agreements discussed above seek to protect. The development of 
countermeasures may or may not change this situation. Moving to deep 
space orbits, for instance, could be effective. But a defense based on 
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technologies with limited range (small homing missiles launched from 
space platforms, for example) might not have much effect on satellite 
systems. The interactions between defenses and space systems security will 
have to be considered very carefully.  
 How can satellites be protected in an world of space-based ballistic 
missile defenses? Obviously, hardening and active defense (shooting back) 
will become even more important. What role bilateral agreements can play 
depends a lot on whether or not the transition to such defenses is 
cooperative, as many members of the Reagan administration insist it must 
be. If defenses are deployed cooperatively, meaning not only that defenses 
are viewed as desirable and stabilizing by both sides, but even that 
technologies or systems may be shared, then there is no reason why both 
sides cannot mutually agree to limit offensive countermeasures to such a 
defense, including ASAT weapons. Keep-out zones could become, by 
agreement, self-defense zones. SDI technologies could be designed so they 
would not threaten the opponent’s system with preemptive destruction, and 
critical satellites could be moved to orbits high enough to avoid the threat 
posed by these BMD weapons.  
 If, on the other hand, the transition to defense were not cooperative 
(which is much more likely), then no controls on ASAT weapons seem 
possible, for the simple reason that ASAT weapons would be a principle 
countermeasure to space-based ABM system components. For every ABM 
system deployed, the opponent would want to deploy an ASAT capable of 
negating it.  
 Although one cannot protect present and currently planned satellite 
systems through restrictions on ASATs and deploy an ABM system at the 
same time, this does not mean that ASAT arms control is impossible while 
research continues on SDI. Resolution of this question depends on whether 
demonstrations and field experiments that may of themselves provide some 
ASAT capabilities are deemed necessary to the SDI R&D program. If, for 
some significant period of time, these demonstrations and field tests are not 
deemed necessary, ASAT limitations could in theory at least be agreed on 
for that period. In the final analysis, however, developing SDI and ASAT 
arms control are probably incompatible.  
 Space as sanctuary 
 Limiting the threat to high-altitude satellites will create a sanctuary in 
space to a certain extent. It is possible that this would actually encourage 
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the use of space for military, but non-weapons, systems, since they would 
be safe from attack. Although it is difficult to foresee examples of this type 
of behavior, one can imagine that, for instance, a device could be built that 
could track ballistic-missile submarines from space. Another example might 
be high-altitude surveillance satellites that could tell if targets were 
destroyed by an initial nuclear attack, in order to direct additional missiles 
to the surviving targets. These developments would represent a clear threat 
to deterrence, and we would certainly want the capability to destroy such 
satellites. But it seems premature to forego arms control just because of 
these theoretical possibilities.  
 Space debris 
 A side benefit of a ban on ASAT testing would be the reduction of space 
debris. The debris accumulating in orbit in the absence of ASAT testing—
paint chips, pieces of exploded boosters, etc.—are suspected to have 
damaged several satellites in the past few years. The risk of collision of a 
shuttle-sized object with a large (greater than one centimeter in diameter) 
piece of debris is currently about 1% per year.xiv It has been estimated that 
the planned U.S. ASAT tests could double the total amount of debris in 
LEO.xv A more extensive ASAT testing program against real satellites might 
make whole regions of space unnavigable. The problem would become 
critical if ASAT tests are conducted at high altitudes, since the debris is 
removed much more slowly—indeed, at geosynchronous altitude, orbits 
decay only one kilometer in altitude every one thousand years.xvi ASATs 
could be tested against balloons, which might decrease somewhat the 
amount of debris generated, but not completely, since such balloons are 
likely to be heavily instrumented.  
CONCLUSIONS 
  The attack warning and communications satellites based in 
geosynchronous orbit are essential for the maintenance of deterrence. These 
satellites are intended to perform vital functions during, or at the outset of, a 
nuclear war. Although current earth-based weapons do not pose the threat 
of rapid destruction of high-altitude satellites, a variety of future 
technologies could be so employed as anti-satellite weapons. These include 
powerful earth-based lasers, and space-based mines, kinetic-energy 
weapons (rail guns and homing missiles), and directed-energy weapons 
(particle beams, optical lasers, x-ray lasers, and microwave weapons).  
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 A variety of passive unilateral countermeasures, including maneuvering, 
use of decoys, hiding, redundancy, and especially hardening and the use of 
deeper orbits, can go a long way toward making satellites more survivable 
and forcing ASATs to become more sophisticated and costly. A vigorous 
program of passive countermeasures should be begun, and it should not be 
delayed by progress in space arms control since such measures will make 
agreements more robust. But passive countermeasures cannot by themselves 
assure survivability. None can prevent the destruction of satellites from, for 
example, a space mine placed near the satellite or the lethal fluence of an x-
ray laser.  
 Active defense of satellites may be able to protect satellites and thwart 
the emplacement of space mines, but this is likely not to be crisis stable. 
Each side could fear preemption and require a hair-trigger posture to 
prevent both satellites and ASATs from being destroyed. Active defense 
would probably also lead to a measure/countermeasure arms race as each 
side attempted to make its satellites and ASATs invulnerable to the other’s 
ASATs. In any case, ASAT deterrence through retaliation in kind is not 
likely to work in a number of war-time situations, because the destruction 
of an opponent’s satellite systems is more valuable to an attacker than 
preservation of systems.  
 Bilateral or multilateral agreements can play a large role in safeguarding 
high-altitude satellites. Bans on testing (and in some cases deployment) of 
new technologies in an ASAT mode can complement negotiated keep-out 
zones in limiting the threat from earth-based as well as space-based ASATs. 
Large-scale testing of an advanced ASAT would be observable, so a ban 
would be verifiable.  
 Limitations on ASATs are not likely to be compatible with the 
deployment of a strategic defense with space-based battle stations. 
Although such battle stations would have to operate over a much larger 
distance when used in an ASAT mode, the scale of an ASAT attack is so 
much smaller than that of a missile defense, and so many more battle 
stations can participate in the ASAT attack than the missile defense, that a 
successful ABM system (other than terminal or other limited range 
defenses) would be a potent ASAT. It is unlikely that either country would 
willingly forego the ASAT option if the other had plans to deploy space-
based ABM components, since ASAT weapons may be one of the most 
effective countermeasures against such a system.  
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 The military uses of space are constantly evolving. The missions 
described here may become more or less important in the future and 
entirely new missions may be added that may change the assessment given 
here. 
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